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The Plight of the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act in the Post-Enron Era: The Ninth Circuit’s 
Interpretation of Materiality in  
Employer-Teamster v. America West 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of Enron and other recent corporate scandals, the 
Bush administration and Congress acted swiftly to protect investors 
and punish corporate fraud with more severity than ever before.1 
Interestingly, President Bush and Congress do not appear to be 
alone in the crackdown on corporate fraud. The recent string of 
corporate collapses has also prompted state and federal courts to 
reevaluate their positions on securities fraud litigation.2 On February 
13, 2003, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Employer-Teamster 
Joint Council v. America West Airlines arguably joined the 
crackdown on corporate fraud by refusing to apply the Third 
Circuit’s bright-line rule3 that a misrepresentation or omission under 
section 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act is immaterial as a 
matter of law if the market does not immediately react upon 
disclosure of the misrepresented or omitted fact. In denying 
defendants’ motion to dismiss under the heightened pleading 
requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
 1. Most prominently, Congress and the Bush administration enacted the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, which enhanced financial disclosure 
requirements, auditing standards, and criminal penalties for several forms of white-collar crime. 
For a discussion of other recent legal developments, see, for example, Joseph Conahan et al., 
Securities Fraud, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1041, 1103−07 (2003); Tower C. Snow, Jr., et al., 
Securities Litigation: Planning and Strategies—The Time Is Now!, Defending Securities Class 
Actions, 83 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 177, 191 (2003).  
 2. See, e.g., John C. Coffee Jr., Post-Enron Jurisprudence, N.Y. L.J., July 17, 2003, at 5, 
available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news/july_2003/coffee_nyljjuly 
(noting the recent string of cases in Delaware and throughout the nation in which courts have 
ignored “once settled rules limiting litigation” by allowing certain derivative actions to proceed 
and reinstating once-dismissed cases).  
 3. In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 
1997) (holding that stockholder plaintiffs failed to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) because defendant corporation’s disclosure of allegedly misrepresented 
information did not affect the price of the corporation’s stock on the date of disclosure). The 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that “[i]n the context of an ‘efficient’ market, the 
concept of materiality translates into information that alters the price of [a] firm’s stock.” Id.  
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(PSLRA),4 the Ninth Circuit invoked the following rationale: “In 
this era of corporate scandal, when insiders manipulate the market 
with the complicity of lawyers and accountants, we are cautious not 
to raise the bar of the PSLRA any higher than that which is required 
under its mandates.”5
The majority’s post-Enron rationale did not go unchallenged. In 
dissent, Judge Tallman noted, “There is no doubt in this post-Enron 
era suspicions have been raised regarding corporate malfeasance and 
insider trading. But the law is the law. Under the Reform Act, the 
burden to plead facts with particularity establishing the required 
element of materiality remains squarely on plaintiffs.”6 Judge 
Tallman concluded that “[t]he market’s collective yawn to the 
allegedly material news [was] fatal to plaintiffs’ ability to successfully 
establish the reliance element of their cause of action” and is 
“contrary to what the Supreme Court and our sister circuits have 
said in similar cases.”7  
The Ninth Circuit’s decision to reject the Third Circuit’s bright-
line rule was particularly surprising given the fact that the Ninth 
Circuit has arguably been one of the most corporate-friendly forums 
in the federal circuit since enactment of the PSLRA.8 Consequently, 
by its own admission,9 the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to adopt the Third 
Circuit’s bright-line rule can reasonably be attributed to the seismic 
shift in the political and economic landscape following the Enron 
collapse. Despite the Ninth Circuit’s admission10 that it was 
influenced by factors extraneous to the pleading requirements 
established by the PSLRA and Rule 10b-5, this Note argues that the 
 4. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 
737 (1995) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 77z-2, 78u-4, 78u-5 (2000)). 
 5. No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. America West 
Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 946 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 433 (2003). For a 
discussion of the facts and procedural history of America West, see infra Part III.  
 6. America West, 320 F.3d at 951 (Tallman, J., dissenting). 
 7. Id. at 947 (Tallman, J., dissenting).  
 8. RICHARD PAINTER ET AL., PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT: A 
POST-ENRON ANALYSIS 6, at http://www.fed-soc.org/pdf/PSLRAFINALII.pdf. (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2004). Authors Painter, Farrell, and Adkins point out that some commentators have 
argued that the Ninth Circuit’s 1999 decision in In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities 
Litigation, 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that “deliberate recklessness” must be 
established to meet the PSLRA pleading standards for scienter), actually deterred more 
securities litigation claims than the PSLRA itself. Id. at 6. 
 9. See supra text accompanying note 5. 
 10. See supra text accompanying note 5. 
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Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reached the correct legal 
conclusion—neither the PSLRA nor Rule 10b-5 endorse the Third 
Circuit’s bright-line test that a misrepresentation or omission is 
immaterial if the market fails to react immediately upon disclosure of 
the misrepresented or omitted fact. While Congress certainly 
intended the PSLRA to deter frivolous securities fraud claims, it did 
not intend to fetter plaintiffs with an impossibly strict standard of 
materiality, nor did it intend to create an absolute safe harbor for 
corporate officials to make fraudulent representations. This Note 
concludes that the PSLRA should remain good law, but Congress, 
the Supreme Court, or both should intervene to resolve the 
confusion that has arisen as courts have struggled—as did the Ninth 
Circuit in America West—to interpret and apply the PSLRA pleading 
standards.11 Most importantly, Congress or the Supreme Court 
should identify the impact, if any, the PSLRA had on the standards 
of materiality and reliance that were adopted by the Supreme Court 
in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. Likewise, Congress or the Supreme Court 
should define the contours of the fraud-on-the-market theory in 
litigating claims under the PSLRA. Indeed, much of the 
disagreement and confusion surrounding cases like America West has 
arisen because Congress failed to even address the materiality and 
reliance elements in the text of the PSLRA.  
This Note begins in Part II with a brief discussion and 
background of the 1934 Act and the PSLRA, paying particular 
attention to the development of the fraud-on-the-market theory 
under the 1934 Act and the PSLRA. Part III provides the factual 
and procedural background of America West. Part IV advances two 
primary arguments: (1) the Ninth Circuit properly rejected the Third 
Circuit’s bright-line rule that a misrepresentation or omission is 
immaterial as a matter of law if the market fails to immediately react 
upon disclosure of the alleged misrepresentation or omission, and 
(2) the PSLRA should survive the post-Enron era, but the status of 
the fraud-on-the-market theory and, most importantly, the 
 11. This Note concludes that the PSLRA as a whole has had a beneficial impact on 
securities litigation; nonetheless, this Note deliberately restricts its focus to the PSLRA’s 
heightened pleading requirements, most notably, the absence of any requirements for pleading 
materiality and reliance under the PSLRA. This Note does not address the mélange of other 
issues that have arisen since enactment of the PSLRA, including the controversies surrounding 
the PSLRA’s provisions for accounting fraud, standards for falsity and scienter, safe harbors for 
“forward-looking” statements, limitations on damages, and appointments of lead plaintiffs and 
lead counsel.  
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appropriate standard of materiality under the PSLRA should be 
clarified through legislative decree or judicial interpretation. Part V 
offers a brief conclusion. 
II. BACKGROUND 
To understand the issues presented in America West, it is 
essential to understand some legal and historical background 
concerning the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the PSLRA, 
especially the development of the fraud-on-the-market theory and 
the development of the standards of materiality and reliance for 
pleading securities fraud under each of the two acts. 
A. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934   
1. Background 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”) is a 
comprehensive federal body of securities law that was designed 
primarily to protect investors against the manipulation of stock prices 
by fraudulent corporate practices.12 The adoption of a federal body 
of securities law was arguably produced out of necessity following 
the 1929 stock market crash and the subsequent economic instability 
that plagued the United States during the 1930s.13 When President 
Roosevelt addressed Congress in March 1933 with plans for 
extensive economic legislation, he argued that federal supervision of 
the securities market was necessary to ensure “‘full publicity and 
information, and that no essentially important element attending the 
 12. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a–
78mm (2000)); see, e.g., Jeffrey L. Oldham, Comment, Taking “Efficient Markets” Out of the 
Fraud-on-the-Market Doctrine After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 995, 1001 (2003). 
 13. Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Comment, Introductory Comment: A 
Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 
OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 338 (1988). Keller and Gehlmann point out that “[t]he minimal impact of 
the [state] blue sky laws and the failure of the states to adopt uniform laws clearly led to a 
demand for federal legislation.” Id. at 336; see also Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and the Courts’ 
Approach to Disclosure of Earnings Projections, Asset Appraisals, and Other Soft Information: 
Old Problems, Changing Views, 46 MD. L. REV. 1114, 1132 (1987) (“‘The wild unorganized 
accounting of the 1920’s frequently accepted purported values as the basis for security issues, 
and the result was widespread frauds, deception of investors and losses.’” (quoting Homer 
Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151, 
1188 (1970))).  
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issue shall be concealed from the buying public.’”14 The Supreme 
Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson aptly described the underlying 
rationale for the adoption of extensive disclosure requirements: 
“‘There cannot be honest markets without honest publicity. 
Manipulation and dishonest practices of the market place thrive upon 
mystery and secrecy.’”15
The core of the 1934 Act’s antifraud provisions are located in 
section 10(b).16 Remarkably, the bulk of the 1934 Act has suffered 
relatively few changes since its enactment. In fact, most of the 
development of securities law has been left to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the courts.17 Pursuant to its authority 
under section 10(b),18 the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5,19 which (as 
the Supreme Court later concluded)20 provides a private cause of 
action against perpetrators of securities fraud and insider trading. In 
relevant part, Rule 10b-5 reads as follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the 
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or 
of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, 
 . . . .  
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit 
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading . . .  
 . . . .  
 in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.21
Despite its relatively simple formulation, Rule 10b-5 litigation 
has developed into a complex body of case law.22 In response to a 
lack of guidance from statutory language or legislative history, 
federal courts have been forced to rely on common-law tort 
 14. Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 13, at 338 (quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt, address 
to Congress (March 1933), reprinted in M. PARRINO, TRUTH IN SECURITIES 23 (1968)).  
 15. 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 11 (1934)).  
 16. Oldham, supra note 12, at 1001.  
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(2000); Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 13, at 352.  
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.  
 19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003). 
 20. Oldham, supra note 12, at 1002.  
 21. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 22. Oldham, supra note 12, at 1003. 
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principles to apply Rule 10b-5.23 Using the common law of fraud as 
its starting point, the federal judiciary derived "materiality, scienter, 
reliance, and loss causation" as the basic elements of a 10b-5 claim.24 
In combination, these elements require plaintiffs to prove reliance on 
a “material misstatement or omission that caused them injury, and 
that the defendants knowingly intended to induce their reliance.”25 
Of the elements necessary to bring a section 10b-5 claim, an 
understanding of materiality and reliance—and their relationship to 
the fraud-on-the-market theory—is essential to an understanding of 
the controversy in America West. 
2. The standard of materiality under the 1934 Act 
The Supreme Court has addressed several positive and common-
law requirements for a violation of section 10(b), including the 
standard of materiality applicable to securities laws.26 Perhaps the 
most important Supreme Court decisions affecting the standard of 
materiality in securities fraud cases are TSC Industries, Inc. v. 
Northway, Inc.27 and Basic Inc. v. Levinson.28
In TSC Industries, the plaintiff, a majority TSC shareholder, 
alleged that the corporation’s proxy statement (soliciting the 
stockholders’ approval of a transaction whereby TSC would become 
a wholly owned subsidiary of another corporation) was materially 
misleading under section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 because it failed to 
disclose the extent of National’s control over TSC at the time the 
transaction was approved by the TSC Board.29 In holding that the 
omission was not material as a matter of law (in a summary judgment 
context),30 the Supreme Court nevertheless stipulated that “an 
omitted fact is ‘material’ if there is a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how 
to vote.”31 The Court further explained that to fulfill the materiality 
requirement “there must be a substantial likelihood that the 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 25. Id.  
 26. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988). 
 27. 426 U.S. 438 (1976). 
 28. Basic, 484 U.S at 224. 
 29. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 441−43. 
 30. Id. at 452. 
 31. Id. at 449.  
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disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the 
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of 
information made available.”32 Although the TSC Industries court 
intended its definition of materiality solely for Rule 14a-9 contexts, 
federal courts that followed TSC Industries almost universally 
adopted the TSC Industries standard of materiality even outside the 
Rule 14a-9 context.33
Twelve years later, in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court 
officially extended the TSC Industries standard of materiality to both 
the section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 contexts.34 In adopting the TSC 
Industries standard of materiality, the Supreme Court held that the 
defendant, Basic Inc., violated Rule 10b-5 when the company falsely 
denied that it was involved in merger negotiations with another 
corporation.35 The Court acknowledged, however, that “certain 
information concerning corporate developments could well be of 
‘dubious significance.’”36 Thus, the Court took steps to ensure that 
it did not “set too low a standard of materiality” out of concern that 
“a minimal standard might bring an overabundance of information 
within its reach, and lead management ‘simply to bury the 
shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information—a result that is 
hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking.’”37 Because the Court 
refused to set a low standard of materiality, federal judges (and 
corporate officials) following the Basic decision have often struggled 
to distinguish between information critical to “informed 
decisionmaking” and information that is merely of “dubious 
significance.”38 This difficulty of distinguishing between material and 
nonmaterial information grew even more severe following the passage 
of the PSLRA, especially in the context of class action lawsuits alleging 
securities fraud under a fraud-on-the-market theory.39  
 32. Id.  
 33. Hugh Beck, Note, Determining the Materiality of Earnings Forecasts Under the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in Helwig v. Vencor, 2002 BYU L. REV. 111, 123.  
 34. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 224 (1988). 
 35. Id. at 226−28.  
 36. Id. at 231 (quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448).  
 37. Id. (quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448−49).  
 38. Id.; see also Beck, supra note 33, at 127−28 (noting that lower courts used several 
different materiality tests in post-Basic court decisions).  
 39. See, e.g., Herbert S. Wander & Katten Muchin Zavis Rosenman, Securities Law 
Disclosure After Sarbanes-Oxley, June 2003, 1381 P.L.I.-CORP. 11, 56−58 (Aug. 14−15, 2003) 
(noting the disagreement between the Third and Fifth Circuit approaches to materiality, as 
well as the Ninth Circuit’s divergent approach in America West); see also MARTIN D. 
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3. Reliance and the fraud-on-the-market theory 
 Prior to Basic, Rule 10b-5 litigants were required to prove actual 
reliance on the corporate defendant’s misrepresentation or 
omission.40 After Basic, however, class action plaintiffs bringing a 
Rule 10b-5 claim were no longer required to prove actual reliance in 
cases involving securities traded on an open market.41 In carving out 
this exception for plaintiffs in class action securities fraud claims, the 
Supreme Court recognized the “fraud-on-the-market” theory, which 
is sustained by the premise that the price of a security traded in an 
open and developed market inherently reflects any 
misrepresentations or omissions made by the corporation.42 In other 
words, “[s]ince investors purchase or sell . . . securities in reliance 
upon the integrity of the market price, they indirectly rely upon . . . 
misrepresentation[s] because they buy or sell . . . at a price that 
reflects the misrepresentation[s].”43 Accordingly, the Basic Court 
held that a corporation’s misrepresentation “acts as a fraud on the 
entire market and that the plaintiffs’ reliance on the market price 
indirectly suffices to establish the reliance requirement.”44
Although the Basic court created a presumption of reliance for 
class action plaintiffs bringing securities fraud claims, the Supreme 
Court also recognized the potential for corporate defendants to 
rebut the presumption of investor reliance by “‘[a]ny showing that 
severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and . . . the 
price received (or paid) by the plaintiff . . . .’”45 Despite the Court’s 
insistence that the presumption of investor reliance can be rebutted, 
 
CHITWOOD & NICHOLE T. BROWNING, PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 
1995 (PSLRA) UPDATE, at http://classlaw.com/CM/Articles/articles6.asp (last visited Mar. 
8, 2004); Jonathan C. Dickey & Shoshanah V. Asnis, Securities Litigation Update: Recent 
Developments Under the PSLRA and the Uniform Standards Act of 2003, http://www.gdclaw. 
com/fstore/documents/pubs/SecLit_PSLRA.pdf (last visited May 26, 2004); Oldham, supra 
note 12, at 1015. 
 40. Oldham, supra note 12, at 995.  
 41. Id.  
 42. Id.  
 43. Id.  
 44. Id.  
 45. Joel W. Sternman et al., Discovery Stays, Lead Plaintiffs and the Fraud-on-the-Market 
Theory: Observations on the PSLRA and Recommendations for Change, 1015 P.L.I. 295, 365 
(1997) (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988)).  
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practical experience suggests that defendants have faced a nearly 
impossible task in rebutting a presumption of reliance.46
Ultimately, the fraud-on-the-market theory can be summarized 
as follows: 
 a. A company’s shares were traded on an efficient market. 
 b. Defendants were responsible for material misstatements 
concerning the company. 
 c. At least some investors, reading these misstatements and 
believing them accurately to reflect material information about the 
company, based significant trading decisions thereon, resulting in 
purchases causing an artificial inflation (or sales causing an artificial 
depression) in the market price of its shares. 
 d. Other buyers or sellers, including many putative class 
members, while unaware of the statements, subsequently bought or 
sold the company’s shares and, by virtue of the artificial 
inflation/depression in the market price, paid more, or received 
less, than they would have had the statements been accurate. 
Under the fraud-on-the-market theory, those buyers/sellers may 
benefit from a presumption that, in trading, they relied on the 
integrity of the market to set a fair price for the shares. So long as 
some investors in the company were deceived in fact by the 
statements and, acting in actual reliance thereon, traded a quantity 
of shares sufficient to cause an artificial change in the market price, 
the fact that these putative class members never saw the statements 
would not, in the first instance, preclude the pursuit of their claims. 
 e. One way defendants may rebut the presumption of reliance is 
by showing that there never was an artificial change in the market 
price of the stock at issue, such as would be the case if trading by 
those investors actually relying upon and deceived by the 
misstatements was so minimal that it had no effect on the market 
price. Because trading causing an artificial change in the company’s 
 46. See, e.g., id. at 366–69. There have been only a few isolated cases in which federal 
courts have recognized a defendant’s attempt to rebut a presumption of reliance, including, 
most notably, In re Apple Computer Securities Litigation, 886 F.2d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 
1989) (holding that widespread press reports that Apple’s “Lisa” computers entailed 
significant risks for investors were sufficient to counteract any optimistic statements made by 
Apple); see also Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that the fraud-
on-the-market theory can be rebutted “by proving that, despite materiality, an insufficient 
number of traders relied to inflate the price”); Sternman et al., supra note 45, at 365−72. 
Aside from these rare instances, corporate defendants have rarely prevailed in rebutting a 
presumption of reliance. Id. at 366. 
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market price would not have occurred, those who did not actually 
rely upon the statements, but only relied on the integrity of the 
market, would not have suffered any actionable damage.47
While the Supreme Court’s adoption of the fraud-on-the-market 
theory in Basic offered increased protection to investors, the 
Supreme Court’s opinion opened the door to a great deal of 
confusion. As Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller point out, 
the Court’s “opinion was vague as to how the theory should be 
applied in future cases,” and “[b]ecause the Court itself lacked a 
good understanding of the nature of the economic hypothesis it was 
purportedly adopting, its decision gives little guidance to future 
litigants.”48 To make matters worse, the uncertainty surrounding the 
proper application of the fraud-on-the-market theory following Basic 
intensified after enactment of the PSLRA.49
B. The PSLRA 
1. Background 
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA” 
or “Reform Act”)50 was enacted by Congress on December 22, 1995 
over President Clinton’s veto.51 The PSLRA was motivated by 
 47. Sternman et al., supra note 45, at 377−80.  
 48. Jonathon P. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis 
of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1077 (1990). Macey and Miller 
describe the Court’s “incompetence” to adopt a particular market theory in the following way: 
The Court’s confusion became transparent during its discussion of which version of 
the ECMH [Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis] it was embracing. The majority 
noted that, although it was accepting the fraud-on-the-market theory as creating a 
rebuttable presumption of reliance in 10b-5 cases, ‘we do not intend conclusively to 
adopt any particular theory of how quickly and completely publicly available 
information is reflected in market price.’ Despite this disclaimer, the Court was 
adopting the semi-strong version of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, whether 
it was aware it was doing so or not. 
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 
224, 248 n.28 (1988)). 
 49. See, e.g., Oldham, supra note 12, at 1029−30. “[I]mplementation of the [fraud-on-
the-market] doctrine by lower courts has been characterized by a complete lack of uniformity, 
both substantively and procedurally, which has led to an inconsistent and sweeping fraud-on-
the-market presumption.” Id. at 1029. 
 50. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 
77z-2, 78u-4, 78u-5 (2000)). 
 51. CHITWOOD & BROWNING, supra note 39 (“In his veto message, President Clinton 
observed that the PSLRA would ‘have the effect of closing the courthouse door on investors 
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several perceived problems that were arguably well documented in 
congressional hearings and academic studies over the years leading 
up to its enactment.52 Specifically, the PSLRA was intended to deter 
“strike suits,” wherein shareholders would file meritless class action 
suits with the aim of pressuring corporate defendants into settling 
claims as an alternative to submitting to costly discovery processes.53 
Not surprisingly, enactment of the PSLRA was supported by 
corporate officials, accountants, and lawyers,54 and was criticized by 
consumer groups, investors, and plaintiff lawyers.55
With the stated purpose of deterring frivolous securities fraud 
claims, the PSLRA heightens the pleading requirements for private 
litigants by requiring that a complaint plead with particularity both 
falsity and scienter.56 To satisfy the PSLRA’s falsity requirement, a 
complaint must “specify each statement alleged to have been 
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, 
and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on 
information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all 
facts on which that belief is formed.”57 In order to satisfy the scienter 
requirement under the PSLRA, the complaint must “state with 
 
who have legitimate claims.’” Id. (citing 141 CONG. REC. H15214-06 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 
1995))).  
 52. R. Bruce Josten, Executive Vice President of Government Affairs, United States 
Chamber of Commerce, Letter to the U.S. Senate: PSLRA and the Uniform Standards Act (Feb. 
27, 2002), at http://www.uschamber.com/government/letters/020227s.htm.  
Those hearings and studies demonstrated that a small coterie of plaintiffs’ lawyers 
brought suit whenever a company’s stock price fell for any reason, alleging that 
securities fraud was responsible. To serve as their ostensible clients, the lawyers 
recruited professional plaintiffs who bought a few shares of many companies’ stock 
for the sole purpose of bringing a class action suit the day after the share price 
declined. The lawyers would file literally the same boilerplate complaint in case after 
case–sometimes even forgetting to change the names of the companies listed as the 
defendant. The point of this exercise was to extract hefty attorneys’ fees from 
companies that couldn’t afford years of litigation over nuisance suits. 
Id. 
 53. See Oldham, supra note 12, at 1021−22. 
 54. Carrie Johnson, Fight Renewed Over Limits on Investor Suits, WASH. POST, May 10, 
2002, at E01, available at 2002 WL 20708365. Johnson notes that “[a]ccountants at what 
were then the Big Six firms lobbied aggressively for the measure, spending millions of dollars. 
The major accounting firms argued that they were unfairly targeted in shareholder lawsuits 
because of their deep pockets. Leaders of Arthur Andersen were so pleased with their efforts 
they encased the text of the new law in a paperweight and handed it out as a souvenir.” Id.  
 55. Id.  
 56. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) & (2) (2000).  
 57. Id. § 78u-4(b)(1).  
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particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant 
acted with the required state of mind.”58 Finally, if the complaint 
fails to satisfy both the falsity and scienter requirements, the PSLRA 
provides that “the court shall, on the motion of any defendant, 
dismiss the complaint . . . .”59  
2. The standard of materiality under the PSLRA 
The standard of materiality in fraud-on-the-market actions was 
left undisturbed by the drafters of the PSLRA.60 Consequently, 
federal courts should be bound to apply the same standard of 
materiality61 established by the Supreme Court in TSC Industries and 
Basic. Nevertheless, federal courts have produced inconsistent 
outcomes using the TSC-Basic framework, likely because it is 
generally accepted that the PSLRA was intended to heighten the 
pleading standards under the 1934 Act.62 In fact, the uncertainty 
surrounding the proper standard of materiality under the PSLRA 
arguably contributed to the disagreement between the majority and 
dissenting opinions in America West, as the Ninth Circuit judges 
were forced to reconcile the policy rationale that invigorates the 
PSLRA (the need to protect corporations from the costs of strike 
suits) with the policy rationale advanced in Basic (the need to protect 
investors in class actions from the costs of proving actual reliance). 
 58. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2).  
 59. Id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A).  
 60. Beck, supra note 33, at 112 (“[T]he PSLRA does not express an explicit preference 
for the standard endorsed in Basic or for any of the bright-line materiality tests . . . .”); see also, 
Oldham, supra note 12, at 998 (“Congress did not speak directly to the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption in the PSLRA.”); Nathaniel Carden, Implications of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 for Judicial Presumptions of Market Efficiency, 65 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 879, 899 (1998) (“Congress rejected a version of the securities litigation reform 
proposals that would have entirely eliminated fraud-on-the-market actions.”). 
 61. See supra text accompanying notes 26−39; see also, e.g., Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 
275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000); No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. 
America West Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 946 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 433 
(2003) (both applying the TSC Industries and Basic standards of materiality to securities fraud 
claims facing motions to dismiss under the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA).  
 62. Oldham, supra note 12, at 1026 (“[T]he PSLRA and its animating policies carry 
important implications for the type of fraud-on-the-market presumption implemented by lower 
federal courts.”). 
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3. Reliance and the fraud-on-the-market theory under the PSLRA 
Like the standard of materiality, the standard of reliance and the 
fraud-on-the-market theory endorsed by the Basic court were not 
affected by enactment of the PSLRA, despite the fact that “[e]arly 
versions of the PSLRA would have eliminated the use of the ‘fraud 
on the market’ theory adopted by the Supreme Court in [Basic].”63 
Nevertheless, the PSLRA has affected the fraud-on-the-market 
theory—whether intentionally or not—in three unique ways: 
First, it reinvigorates the loss-causation element as a requirement 
for plaintiffs, which may be at odds with Basic’s double 
presumption of the loss-causation trigger and reliance. Second, 
the PSLRA’s damages provision and its underlying policies 
evidence a rejection of the efficient market theory as a 
descriptive theory of the marketplace. Third, the PSLRA’s 
conservative, pragmatic policies demonstrate Congress’s desire 
to reduce the amount of meritless securities litigation, an aim 
that is inconsistent with a sweeping presumption that facilitates 
more litigation without any relation to the merits of a claim, as 
found in Basic.64  
As a result, courts must continue to address the “amorphous 
implications” of Basic “without any statutory guidelines”65 at the 
same time that they must apply a Reform Act with the stated purpose 
of deterring securities fraud claims at the earliest possible litigation 
stage. Again, this confusion likely led to the misunderstanding and 
disagreement between the majority and dissenting opinions in 
America West. 
III. EMPLOYER-TEAMSTER V. AMERICA WEST 
A. Factual Background 
From 1995 to 1997, the defendant (“America West”) received 
various warnings that its maintenance practices violated FAA 
standards.66 Despite its maintenance problems, America West assured 
investors that its “maintenance issues were being addressed” and that 
 63. Sternman et al., supra note 45, at 361 (citation omitted).  
 64. Oldham, supra note 12, at 998.  
 65. Sternam et al., supra note 45, at 361−62; see also supra notes 55−56 and 
accompanying text.  
 66. America West, 320 F.3d at 926.  
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“fixes [were] in place.”67 During this same period of time, America 
West insiders allegedly colluded to raise the price of America West 
stock by May 20, 1998—the date on which they could sell their 
stock to the public under the stockholder’s agreement.68 To 
effectuate its plan to raise the price of its stock, America West 
allegedly made false statements about the company’s outlook and 
misinformed analysts that its operational problems had been fixed by 
claiming that its improved profits were the result of “exceptionally 
efficient management,” rather than unsafe maintenance practices and 
underreported maintenance costs.69 By April 1998, the value of 
America West’s stock had climbed to $31-5/16, at which time 
several “high ranking . . . ‘insiders’” began selling millions in 
America West stock.70  
In July 1998, following the announcement of a settlement with 
the FAA for violations of FAA maintenance regulations, America 
West’s stock began to decline in value.71 By September 1998, 
analysts predicted huge shortfalls for America West during the third 
and fourth quarters of 1998.72 Around the same time, DLJ Securities 
reported that the “cause of America West’s earnings deficiencies 
appeared to be ‘100% operational’ and that these problems were the 
result of ongoing labor issues and ‘a far more smothering presence of 
the [FAA] on the “property” than we had understood.’”73 DLJ’s 
report also noted its disturbance with the fact that America West’s 
operational problems were “reminiscent of operationally-related 
earnings shortfalls in 1996,” and that it had “‘no inkling from the 
company of the problems . . . .’”74 The stock eventually fell to a low 
of $9-5/8 in early October 1998.75
 67. Id. at 927 (quoting Richard R. Goodmanson, then President and CEO of America 
West).  
 68. Id. at 927−28.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 928.  
 71. Id. at 928−30.  
 72. Id. at 930. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. (omission in original). 
 75. Id.  
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B. Procedural History 
Investors filed a securities fraud class action on behalf of all 
individuals who had purchased America West Class B common stock 
during the class period.76 Investors alleged that America West had 
violated Rule 10b-5 as well as sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the 1934 
Act.77
In October 2000, the district court dismissed Investors’ case 
with leave to amend for failure to state a claim under the heightened 
pleading requirement contained in the PSLRA.78 The district court 
cited two particular failures: “(1) plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently 
support their allegations of false and misleading statements with 
great detail and all relevant circumstances; and (2) plaintiffs had 
failed to state with particularity facts that gave rise to a strong 
inference of deliberate recklessness or actual intent.”79  
In June 2001, five months after Investors had filed their second 
amended complaint, the district court dismissed Investors’ complaint 
“with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and failure to meet the heightened 
pleading requirements of the PLSRA.”80 Investors promptly appealed 
the district court’s decision in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.81  
C. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ Holding 
The court of appeals reversed the district court’s dismissal. The 
majority rejected the district court’s conclusion that Investors had 
failed to plead facts sufficient to “raise a strong inference that 
Defendants made false or misleading statements with actual 
knowledge or deliberate recklessness” in violation of section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5.82 Most importantly, the court of appeals rejected 
the district court’s adoption of the Third Circuit’s bright-line rule 
that alleged misrepresentations are “immaterial as a matter of law” 
whenever the “market does not react immediately upon disclosure of 
 76. Id. at 924.  
 77. Id. at 930. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at 930−31.  
 81. Id. at 931.  
 82. Id. at 946.  
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the misrepresented information.”83 In declining to adopt the Third 
Circuit’s bright-line rule, the court of appeals reasoned that 
“adoption of such a rule would contravene” the framework 
established by the Supreme Court in Basic and TSC Industries.84
After declining to adopt the Third Circuit’s bright-line rule, the 
majority proceeded to the facts alleged by Investors and concluded 
that plaintiffs had “sufficiently pleaded the materiality of America 
West’s misrepresentations regarding its maintenance issues, the FAA 
investigation, and the FAA settlement agreement.”85 The court of 
appeals determined that “[a] reasonable investor would find 
significant the information regarding a company’s deferred 
maintenance costs, unsafe maintenance practices, and possible 
sanction.”86 Likewise, the court of appeals concluded that “a 
reasonable investor would consider the potential effects of each of 
these facts on the overall economic health of the company as 
“‘significantly alter[ing] the ‘total mix’ of information made 
available.’”87 Most importantly, the court of appeals noted that 
“although America West’s . . . disclosures had no immediate effect 
on the market price, its stock price dropped 31% on September 3, 
1998 when the full economic effects of the settlement agreement 
and the ongoing maintenance problems were finally disclosed to the 
market.”88
In dissent, Judge Tallman concluded that the absence of an 
immediate market reaction to the allegedly material news was “fatal 
to plaintiffs’ ability to successfully establish the reliance element of 
their cause of action under a ‘fraud-on-the-market’ theory.”89 Judge 
Tallman argued that the majority’s refusal to adopt the Third 
Circuit’s bright-line rule was “contrary to what the Supreme Court 
 83. Id. at 934.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 935.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)) 
(alteration in original).  
 88. Id. The court of appeals also noted that “[t]his reaction, even if slightly delayed, 
further supports a finding of materiality. This is particularly true because Plaintiffs offer a 
reason for the delay, i.e., America West continued to reassure analysts that the settlement 
agreement and compliance therewith would not have noticeable economic effects on the 
company.” Id.  
 89. Id. at 947 (Tallman, J., dissenting). 
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and our sister circuits have said in similar cases.”90 Judge Tallman 
thus issued the following disagreement with the majority’s decision:  
While we are required to draw all inferences in favor of 
plaintiffs for purposes of a motion to dismiss, under the Reform 
Act the burden remains on the plaintiffs to plead with specificity 
the facts showing a materially misleading statement. The 
plaintiffs here have not alleged with specificity facts that would 
support the inferences the plaintiffs ask us to draw. 
What the plaintiffs fail to show is any causal connection 
between the FAA investigation and fine and the poor third-
quarter performance. . . . 91
. . . .  
. . . Since these questions are left unanswered by the 
complaint, we cannot under the Reform Act simply give the 
plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt and view the market’s reaction 
in September as indicative of the materiality of the misleading 
statements regarding the FAA investigation and settlement.92
Despite Judge Tallman’s heavy reliance on the precedent 
established by the Third Circuit, the following section of this Note 
argues that, as a matter of both legal precedent and policy, the 
majority reached the correct decision. The district court wrongfully 
dismissed Investors’ claim by basing its decision on the mere fact 
that the market did not react immediately upon disclosure of 
America West’s misrepresentations. 
 90. Id. “The Third Circuit has held that in an efficient market, the concept of 
materiality ‘translates into information that alters the price of the firm’s stock.’” Id. (quoting 
In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997)). Also, “[t]he 
Third Circuit observed that since ‘efficient markets are those in which information important 
to reasonable investors . . . is immediately incorporated into stock prices,’ information not 
important to reasonable investors ‘will have a negligible effect on the stock price.’’’ Id. 
(quoting In re Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1425, and citing Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 282 
(3d Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen a stock is traded in an efficient market, the materiality of disclosed 
information may be measured post hoc by looking to the movement, in the period 
immediately following disclosure, of the price of the firm’s stock.”)).  
 91. Id. at 950 (Tallman, J., dissenting). 
 92. Id. (Tallman, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).  
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IV. ANALYSIS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT PROPERLY REJECTED THE 
THIRD CIRCUIT’S BRIGHT-LINE RULE BUT FAILED TO 
ARTICULATE THE APPROPRIATE RATIONALE FOR ITS DECISION 
This Part analyzes the two issues that are central or relevant to 
the principal case: (1) whether the Ninth Circuit properly rejected 
the Third Circuit’s bright-line rule that, in order for a 
misrepresentation or omission to be material, the securities market 
must immediately react upon disclosure of the misrepresented or 
omitted fact; and (2) whether the PSLRA should be modified or 
repealed in light of the recent outbreak of securities fraud. Part IV.A 
discusses the legal and policy reasons why the Ninth Circuit properly 
rejected the Third Circuit’s bright-line rule—despite inappropriately 
adopting its post-Enron rationale. Part IV.B argues that America 
West reflects a trend among federal courts to interpret the PSLRA 
according to fluctuations in economic and political conditions, rather 
than the language of the PSLRA itself. It concludes that the PSLRA 
is a necessary step to achieve litigation reform, but the pleading 
requirements outlined in the PSLRA should be revised by Congress 
or, at the very least, interpreted by the Supreme Court in order to 
resolve the circuit splits that have arisen and will continue to arise if 
federal courts are left unguided in their interpretation and 
application of the PSLRA. 
A. A Misrepresentation or Omission Should Not Be Deemed 
Immaterial as a Matter of Law Merely Because the Market Fails To 
Immediately React upon Disclosure 
The court of appeals properly rejected the Third Circuit’s bright-
line rule that an omission or misrepresentation is immaterial as a 
matter of law if the market fails to immediately react upon 
disclosure.93 The majority reasoned that adoption of such a per se 
 93. See Oran, 226 F.3d at 282. In its discussion of materiality, the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals invoked a bright-line rule it had fashioned three years earlier in In re Burlington 
Coat Factory Securities Litigation: 
[I]n an open and developed securities market like the New York Stock Exchange, 
the price of a company’s stock is determined by all available material information 
regarding the company and its business. In such an efficient market, “information 
important to reasonable investors . . . is immediately incorporated into the stock 
price.” As a result, when a stock is traded in an efficient market, the materiality of 
disclosed information may be measured post hoc by looking to the movement, in 
the period immediately following disclosure, of the price of the firm’s stock. Because 
in an efficient market “the concept of materiality translates into information that 
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rule would contravene the Supreme Court’s holding in Basic,94 
which “expressly adopted the ‘reasonable investor’ standard set forth 
in TSC Industries for determining materiality in the Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 context.”95 Under TSC Industries, “[a]n omitted 
fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that . . . the omitted 
fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of 
the reasonable shareholder.”96 Applying this same standard of 
reasonableness to the facts in America West, the court of appeals 
readily determined that a reasonable investor would consider the 
existence of such information as deferred maintenance costs and 
ongoing FAA maintenance violations “important” to his or her 
“deliberations” as a shareholder.97
1. The PSLRA did not alter the materiality and reliance standards 
established in Basic 
Admittedly, the Supreme Court in Basic adopted the fraud-on-
the-market theory under the premise that “in a modern and efficient 
securities market, the market price of a stock incorporates all 
available public information.”98 However, there is no explicit 
requirement that a stock’s value must immediately reflect a change in 
available public information. In fact, as the Ninth Circuit itself aptly 
noted, the Basic Court expressly refused to adopt such a bright-line 
formulation: 
In Basic, the Court recognized the difficulty of proving investor 
reliance on a misrepresentation or omission by a corporation. Thus, 
the Court created a rebuttable presumption of investor reliance 
based on the theory that investors presumably rely on the market 
price, which typically reflects the misrepresentation or omission. 
 
alters the price of the firm’s stock,” if a company’s disclosure of information has no 
effect on stock prices, “it follows that the information disclosed . . . was immaterial 
as a matter of law.” 
Oran, 226 F.3d at 282 (quoting In re Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1425) (citation omitted). The 
Third Circuit thus concluded that plaintiffs’ allegations were immaterial as a matter of law 
because the value of the stock at issue failed to exhibit any appreciable negative effects in the 
four days following disclosure. Id. at 282−83.  
 94. America West, 320 F.3d at 934. 
 95. Id. (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988)).  
 96. 426 U.S. at 449.  
 97. Id. 
 98. America West, 320 F.3d at 947 (Tallman, J., dissenting) (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 
246−47).  
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However, in crafting this presumption in favor of investors, the 
Court specifically stated “we do not intend conclusively to adopt 
any particular theory of how quickly and completely publicly 
available information is reflected in the market price.”99  
Despite accurately recognizing the Basic court’s refusal to adopt 
a bright-line rule with respect to when the market must react upon 
disclosure of an omitted or misrepresented fact, the majority failed to 
summarize or discuss whatever impact the PSLRA might have had 
on the “reasonable investor” standard set forth in Basic and TSC 
Industries. Of course, as noted in Part II,100 the actual text of the 
Reform Act says nothing with respect to the standards of materiality 
and reliance under a fraud-on-the-market theory.101 Rather, the text 
of the PSLRA merely heightens the requirements to prove falsity and 
scienter in securities fraud actions.102 Nevertheless, in his dissenting 
opinion, Judge Tallman discusses the materiality and reliance 
standards as if they had somehow been altered by the PSLRA. Thus, 
Judge Tallman argues that, “[u]nder the Reform Act, the burden to 
plead facts with particularity establishing the required element of 
materiality remains squarely on plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also maintain the 
burden to plead detrimental reliance. These pleading standards have 
not been met here.”103 In the following paragraph, Judge Tallman 
once again confuses the materiality and reliance standards established 
under Basic with the PSLRA scienter and falsity requirements: 
 99. Id. at 934 n.12 (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n.28) (citation omitted).  
 100. See supra text accompanying notes 60−65. 
 101. See supra Part II. 
 102. The entire relevant text of the PSLRA regarding pleading requirements for securities 
fraud actions reads as follows: 
[T]he complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the 
reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding 
the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall 
state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed. 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2000). With respect to scienter, the entire relevant text reads 
as follows: 
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff may recover 
money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of 
mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this 
chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the 
defendant acted with the required state of mind.  
Id. § 78u-4(b)(2).  
 103. America West, 320 F.3d at 951 (Tallman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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 While we are required to draw all inferences in favor of plaintiffs 
for purposes of a motion to dismiss, under the Reform Act the 
burden remains on the plaintiffs to plead with specificity the facts 
showing a materially misleading statement. The plaintiffs here have 
not alleged with specificity facts that would support the inferences 
the plaintiffs ask us to draw. 
 What the plaintiffs fail to show is any causal connection between 
the FAA investigation and fine and the poor third-quarter 
performance. . . . 
 . . . . Since these questions are left unanswered by the complaint, 
we cannot under the Reform Act simply give the plaintiffs the 
benefit of the doubt and view the market’s reaction in September 
as indicative of the materiality of the misleading statements 
regarding the FAA investigation and settlement. 104  
Judge Tallman’s language is unmistakable: his repeated 
references to the PSLRA in discussing the materiality and reliance 
elements indicates that his opinion was informed by the wrongful 
assumption that the PSLRA controls the materiality and reliance 
issues. As has already been noted,105 the only support for Judge 
Tallman’s conclusion that the statements were immaterial as a matter 
of law must come from either the text of Rule 10b-5 or the TSC-
Basic framework. While Judge Tallman generally alleges that the 
majority departed from Basic,106 the only specific precedent that 
Judge Tallman invokes to support his conclusion comes from 
neighboring circuit courts. In fact, after working through a cursory 
description of the reasonable investor standard and the fraud-on-the-
market theory established in Basic, Judge Tallman simply engages in 
a lengthy discussion of the established law in other circuits.107
Despite the fact that Judge Tallman confounded his analysis of 
the materiality and reliance elements by referencing the PSLRA, his 
opinion provides a much more clear and concise summary of the 
essential elements to Investors’ cause of action than the majority 
opinion. Judge Tallman summarizes these elements as follows: 
 104. Id. at 950 (Tallman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  
 105. See supra notes 60−65 and accompanying text. 
 106. America West, 320 F.3d at 947 (Tallman, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s analysis is 
contrary to what the Supreme Court and our sister circuits have said in similar cases.”).  
 107. Id. at 947−49 (Tallman, J., dissenting).  
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“(1) that the defendant made public misrepresentations; (2) that 
the misrepresentations were material; (3) that the shares were 
traded on an efficient market; (4) that the misrepresentation would 
induce a reasonable, relying investor to misjudge the value of the 
shares; and (5) that the plaintiff traded the shares between the time 
the misrepresentations were made and the time the truth was 
revealed . . . .”108  
In light of the fact that the PSLRA did not alter the standard of 
materiality set forth in Basic and TSC Industries,109 the court of 
appeals was correct to conclude that all five elements had been met 
for the purposes of stating a valid claim—especially considering the 
fact that the court must draw all inferences in favor of plaintiffs for 
purposes of a motion to dismiss.110 First, there was little debate that 
America West made public misrepresentations, that its shares were 
traded on an efficient market, or that the Investors traded the shares 
during the time the misrepresentations were made. The only 
significant dispute was whether the misrepresentations were material 
and whether an investor could reasonably rely on the 
misrepresentations. Because the PSLRA did not alter the Basic-TSC 
definition of materiality.111 and did not establish a per se requirement 
of immediate market reaction upon disclosure,112 the court of appeals 
correctly concluded that America West’s misrepresentations and 
omissions were material under the Basic-TSC framework. For 
purposes of a motion to dismiss, the court of appeals was obligated 
to draw an inference in favor of Investors that America West’s stock 
plummeted in value because of the misrepresentations—even if the 
decline in stock occurred days or months afterward. 
2. As a matter of policy, the Basic court was wise to avoid adopting a 
bright-line rule that the market must react within a specified period of 
time 
Whenever there is a material change in available public 
information, a period of time inevitably lapses during which the 
public must assimilate the new information and determine the value 
 108. Id. at 947 (Tallman, J., dissenting) (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 
248 n.27 (1988) (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).  
 109. See supra notes 60−65 and accompanying text. 
 110. America West, 320 F.3d at 950 (Tallman, J., dissenting).  
 111. See supra notes 60−65 and accompanying text. 
 112. Id. 
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of the affected security. A security’s value does not always 
immediately reflect presently available public information; rather, a 
security’s value usually reflects the way the public has interpreted 
available public information over a period of time. Whether the public 
makes its determination in one hour, one day, or one month, the 
Basic court likely recognized that there will always be a period of 
time where the value of a stock remains in limbo upon public 
disclosure of an omitted or misrepresented fact. 
If the absence of an immediate market reaction were fatal to 
plaintiffs’ ability to state a claim, innocent investors bringing valid 
securities fraud claims would fail to survive corporate defendants’ 
motions to dismiss because, as this Note has just observed,113 the 
market rarely reacts immediately to disclosures of misrepresented or 
omitted facts. While an efficient market often reacts within hours or 
days of disclosure, there are other extraneous factors that might delay 
a market reaction, including misleading, contemporaneous 
statements issued by the corporate defendant or mistaken reactions 
on the part of analysts and investors. The Third Circuit’s test also 
precludes the distinct possibility that the public might simply be slow 
to recognize the importance of disclosed information in cases 
where—as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found in America 
West—officers or directors issue fraudulent, contemporaneous 
statements intended to eliminate public worries that the newly 
revealed information might affect the stock’s value. The bright-line 
rule put forth by the Third Circuit, while theoretically sound under 
the fraud-on-the-market theory—i.e., a stock’s value in an efficient 
market inherently reflects all “available material information”114—is 
not practically sound in real-world securities markets. 
The Third Circuit’s bright-line rule also forces federal judges to 
decide on a case-by-case basis what constitutes “immediate” market 
reaction—a question that is not always easy to answer—especially at 
the pretrial stage. In reality, the materiality question is a causal 
question115 that is best left for determination at the trial stage—not 
 113. See supra text accompanying note 105.  
 114. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241−42 (1988). 
 115. Id.; Oldham, supra note 12, at 1034−38. “[T]he real inquiry should be whether the 
misrepresentation affected the market price.” Oldham, supra note 12, at 1035. Oldham’s 
position that the determinative question in actions brought under a fraud-on-the-market 
theory should be causation is well supported by a wide range of commentators, including law 
professors Donald Langevoort, Jonathan Macey, and Geoffrey Miller, and finance professors 
Mark Mitchell and Jeffrey Netter. Id. at 1035−36; see also Carden, supra note 60, at 900 
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in the context of a motion to dismiss.116 In fact, the Ninth Circuit 
itself, reasoning from the TSC Industries Court’s position that 
materiality is “a mixed question of law and fact,”117 concluded as 
recently as 1995 that “the materiality of an omission is a ‘fact-specific 
issue which should ordinarily be left to the trier of fact.’”118 The 
same Ninth Circuit decision noted, 
Only in two situations should the Court resolve this question as a 
matter of law: (1) If the immateriality of the statement or allegedly 
omitted fact is so obvious that reasonable minds could not differ  
. . . or (2) “[I]f the information is trivial or is ‘so basic that any 
investor could be expected to know it.’”119  
 The Ninth Circuit’s approach in Fecht is also consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s observance in TSC Industries that “the jury’s 
unique competence in applying the ‘reasonable man’ standard is 
thought ordinarily to preclude summary judgment in negligence 
cases.”120 While there is certainly a reasonable argument for securities 
litigation reform and judicial economy, the rights of securities fraud 
victims should not be trampled in the process of reform. As Arthur 
Miller recently argued, “Courts . . . too often appear to be placing 
their interests in the efficient resolution of disputes, concerns about 
jury capability, and other matters above litigants’ rights to a day in 
court and jury trial . . . .”121  
 
(“Rather than interpreting [the] fraud-on-the-market [theory] as a rebuttable presumption of 
reliance, courts should instead understand the theory as a method of proving causation.”). 
 116. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” 
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial 
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1073 (2003). Miller cites the following example to 
demonstrate the often harsh consequences of the courts’ misuse of the motion to dismiss: 
[I]n In re MCI Worldcom, Inc. Securities Litigation, the plaintiff class complaint 
alleged in great detail material misrepresentations and omissions in violation of the 
Securities Exchange Act. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss, which almost seems whimsical given more recent public revelations about 
the company apparently burying billions of dollars of costs with accounting 
machinations to create a false picture of the company’s profits and sales.  
Id. 
 117. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976).  
 118. Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1080−81 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Kaplan v. 
Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1375 (9th Cir. 1994)).  
 119.  Snow et al., supra note 1, at 269 (quoting Ganino v. Citizens Util. Co., 228 F.3d 
154, 162 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir. 1985))) 
(second alteration in original). 
 120. 426 U.S. at 450 n.12.  
 121. Miller, supra note 116, at 982.  
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A bright-line rule requiring immediate market reaction would 
also force courts to decide what constitutes sufficient market 
reaction, which ultimately defeats the purpose of litigation reform—
to preserve both judicial and economic resources. Not only would 
parties waste time and resources litigating the issue of immediacy, 
they would also waste resources arguing over whether or not there 
was a significant market reaction at all. Courts would once again 
have to decide on a case-by-case basis whether or not the market 
reaction was sufficient to satisfy the reliance and materiality elements, 
despite the fact that, like the immediacy issue, the sufficiency of the 
market’s reaction is a question that should be preserved for the trier 
of fact, not a court handling a motion to dismiss. 
Finally, the Third Circuit’s bright-line rule obscures the only 
truly relevant question under the Basic test—i.e., whether the 
misrepresented or omitted facts would have altered the “total mix” 
of information for a reasonable investor, and whether a reasonable 
investor could have reasonably relied to his or her detriment on the 
misrepresented or omitted facts. While the market’s response time 
and the degree of the market’s reaction are important considerations 
in the materiality and reliance contexts, such factors should not be 
determinative. Ultimately, the immediacy and significance of a 
market’s reaction should serve only as two of several factors which a 
court might weigh in deciding whether to dismiss a case. A court 
should also be empowered (and expected) to look at other evidence 
of materiality, such as insider trading and accounting abnormalities. 
In the principal case, America West itself clearly thought the 
information would have been important to a reasonable investor, or 
it would not have allegedly attempted to conceal the nature of its 
maintenance problems in the first place.122 Surely the officers did not 
conceal the maintenance problems and the deferred maintenance 
costs out of a desire to avoid burying its shareholders in an avalanche 
of “trivial” information. Rather, the directors and officers allegedly 
concealed the corporation’s maintenance problems, as well as the 
looming maintenance costs that the corporation had deferred, in an 
effort to drive up the value of America West’s stock. Furthermore, 
there was extensive evidence of insider trading,123 which is highly 
suggestive that the misrepresentations and omissions were material. 
 122. No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. America West 
Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 927 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 433 (2003). 
 123. Id. at 927−28. 
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Again, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, the court of appeals was 
reasonable to conclude that there was “a substantial likelihood” that 
the disclosure of the omitted facts would have been viewed by the 
“reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of 
information made available.’”124 To deny plaintiffs an opportunity to 
approach the trial stage simply because the market failed to react 
immediately upon disclosure of America West’s misrepresentations 
and omissions would not only injure plaintiffs with valid securities 
fraud claims but would also wrongfully protect corporate officials, 
accountants, and attorneys who willfully defraud the public. 
B. Should the PSLRA Survive in the Post-Enron Era? 
The PSLRA was certainly dealt a heavy blow by the outbreak of 
corporate fraud and the resulting economic instability and public 
outcry, yet no one has presented credible evidence that the Reform 
Act was actually the cause of the Enron collapse.125 Nevertheless, the 
Enron collapse raised suspicions throughout the legal community 
that the PSLRA has overprotected fraudulent corporate executives 
and closed the courthouse to innocent victims of corporate fraud. As 
the America West case demonstrates, even judges have begun to 
question and even redefine the scope and application of the PSLRA. 
This section argues that the PSLRA can be a potentially useful tool 
in reforming securities litigation, but the Act’s pleading standards—
especially with regard to the materiality and reliance elements under 
a fraud on the market cause of action—do not provide sufficient 
guidance to lower federal courts. In fact, the PSLRA’s pleading 
standards have spawned severe confusion126 among lawyers and 
judges and, even worse, have left too much discretion for federal 
courts to fashion rules that contradict the basic principles endorsed 
in TSC Industries and Basic. Congress or the Supreme Court (or 
both) must expand and clarify the pleading standards in a way that 
prevents courts from interpreting and applying the PSLRA by simply 
referring to changes in the political and economic landscape.127 The 
 124. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449. 
 125. PAINTER ET AL., supra note 8, at 28 (“Using Enron to justify . . . roll-backs is ill-
advised where no one has yet repudiated SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt’s testimony before 
Congress that there is no relationship between the PSLRA and the demise of Enron.”). 
 126. Kevin P. Roddy, Seven Years of Practice and Procedure under the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, SJO14 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 395, 436−38 (2003). 
 127. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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pleading standards should be sufficiently clear that lawyers and 
judges can enjoy some degree of certainty with respect to each of the 
falsity, scienter, reliance, and materiality elements. 
The PSLRA has arguably had both a beneficial and detrimental 
impact on securities litigation.128 On the positive side of the 
spectrum, the PSLRA has arguably reduced the number of frivolous 
claims brought by plaintiffs’ lawyers merely seeking to extract a 
settlement offer from corporations who cannot afford to undergo 
costly discovery or time-consuming litigation processes. For example, 
a recent National Economic Research Associates (“NERA”) study 
supports some claims that the PSLRA has reduced nuisance suits.129 
According to the NERA study, settlement values have declined by 
eight percent from 1996 to 2003.130 This trend is particularly 
noteworthy in light of the public outcry and wave of litigation that 
ensued after the string of corporate collapses in 2001. Similarly, the 
PSLRA has arguably cut down on the volume of securities fraud 
claims initiated each year. Although the yearly total of claims 
increased slightly after the PSLRA was enacted, the number likely 
would have been much higher without the PSLRA, given the huge 
increase in publicly traded companies since 1995.131  
Despite some indications that the PSLRA has been successful in 
deterring “strike suits,” many have argued that the PSLRA has had 
disastrous consequences for investors and some have even blamed 
the recent string of corporate collapses on the adoption of the 
PSLRA.132 Others have simply criticized the success of the PSLRA in 
deterring the negative consequences of frivolous lawsuits. According 
 128. For a detailed study of pre-PSLRA and post-PSLRA litigation statistics, see PAINTER 
ET AL., supra note 8, at 11; see also, Roddy, supra note 126; CHITWOOD & BROWNING, supra 
note 39. 
 129. Elaine Buckberg et al., Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation: Will 
Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley Change the Tides?, NERA, available at http://www.nera.com/ 
wwt/publications/6143.pdf (last visited May 26, 2004).  
 130. Id. 
 131. Johnson, supra note 54. 
 132. See, e.g., Robert S. Greenberger, Questioning the Books: Panel in Enron’s Wake to 
Review Lawsuit Curbs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2002, at A8 (“‘By forcing through special 
exemptions for securities, Congress has contributed to the “Wild West” mentality reflected in 
Enron’s hidden partnerships,’ said the judiciary panel’s chairman, Sen. Patrick Leahy (D., 
Vt.).”); see also Johnson, supra note 54, at E01 (“Surveying the post-Enron wreckage, Sen. 
Richard C. Shelby (R-Ala.) says ‘Congress needs to take some blame, noting that seven years 
ago lawmakers passed a measure [the PSLRA] that made it more difficult for investors to sue 
corporations and accounting firms involved in fraud.’”).  
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to one commentator, “the procedural skirmishing in class actions 
brought under the Securities Act of 1933 . . . and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 . . . has been more intense and time-
consuming than that experienced under the prior statutory scheme, 
adding time and expense to the burdens inherent in such cases.”133 
Arguably the most serious criticism of the PSLRA, however, is the 
difficulty that federal courts have had interpreting and applying the 
Act, as well as the severe circuit splits that have arisen in response to 
the Act.134 Indeed, “[d]espite the PSLRA’s stated aim of providing a 
uniform standard for pleading Rule 10b-5 claims, the courts have 
applied a number of different interpretations of the PSLRA’s 
heightened pleading standards.”135 Worst of all, the divergent results 
throughout the federal circuits have spawned a great deal of 
uncertainty, which the PSLRA was intended to avoid in order to 
deter frivolous claims and better compensate plaintiffs who bring 
valid claims.136
Regardless of the arguments made for and against the PSLRA, 
the Ninth Circuit’s reaction to the Enron collapse certainly reflects a 
trend among judges to water-down the PSLRA.137 While the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding is grounded in a solid application of the law, it 
certainly represents a step back from its holding only a few years 
earlier in Silicon Graphics, where the court of appeals raised the 
required state of mind to meet the scienter element under the 
PSLRA to deliberate recklessness—a level more strict than that 
actually required by the PSLRA.138 However, much of the 
uncertainty in America West could have been avoided if Congress 
 133. Roddy, supra note 126, at 404; see also Sherrie R. Savett, The Merits Matter Most 
and Observations on a Changing Landscape Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 525, 531 (1997) (observing that the PSLRA “produces great delay 
in getting the case moving to the merits”).  
 134. See, e.g., CHITWOOD & BROWNING, supra note 39. 
 135. Id. (“Since passage of the PSLRA, several separate lines of authority have developed 
concerning the proper interpretation of the scienter provision.”). For an in-depth outline of 
the circuit courts’ divergent interpretations and applications of the PSLRA, see id.; Dickey & 
Asnis, supra note 39, at http://www.gdclaw.com/fstore/documents/pubs/SecLit_PSLRA 
.pdf (last visited May 26, 2004).  
 136. Dickey & Asnis, supra note 39, at 1 (“In any event, the caselaw under the PSLRA 
and SLUSA surely cannot be said to provide certainty or predictability, and in that respect the 
ultimate congressional goal of eliminating meritless litigation continues to be elusive.”).  
 137. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2; Greenberger, supra note 132; Johnson, supra note 
54, at E01. 
 138. See CHITWOOD & BROWNING, supra note 39, at 7.  
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had simply clarified its position with respect to the materiality and 
reliance elements relevant to cases brought under a fraud-on-the-
market theory. Because Congress makes no mention of either the 
materiality or reliance elements in the PSLRA, courts are left to 
guess what Congress intended, leaving “each circuit to cobble 
together its own frameworks.”139
Given the severe confusion that has arisen among federal courts, 
Congress should revisit the text of the PSLRA and articulate the 
ways—if any—that the materiality and reliance elements have been 
modified by the PSLRA. Even if Congress intends to adopt standards 
as stringent as the Third Circuit’s bright-line rule, it should at least say 
so in the text of the PSLRA in order to avoid confusion. Finally, if 
Congress is unable or unwilling to revisit the PSLRA, the Supreme 
Court should provide some insight by hearing appeals involving the 
most common circuit splits—especially those circuit splits involving 
the materiality and reliance elements. Without further guidance from 
Congress or the Supreme Court, the PSLRA will spawn more 
confusing case law, more severe circuit splits, and more intense 
suspicions of the PSLRA from both its supporters and its detractors. 
Ultimately, a practical approach to deciding materiality, especially 
for purposes of a motion to dismiss, would require judges to decide 
only the issue of loss causation.140 In other words, a judge should 
merely ask whether the revelations of allegedly misrepresented or 
omitted facts could have reasonably caused the value of the stock to 
change. Under this approach, unless “reasonable minds could not 
differ,” or the information “is so basic that any investor would be 
expected to know,” a court should never dismiss a case where plaintiffs 
establish a reasonable inference that a misrepresentation or omission 
had a causal impact on the value of a corporation’s stock. 
 139. Id. Note, however, that even the two elements that are defined in the text of the 
PSLRA have spawned a great deal of confusion. See id.  
 140. See Oldham, supra note 12, at 999.  
[I]n determining whether the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance applies, 
courts should require plaintiffs to prove that a company’s alleged misrepresentation 
actually affected the price of the company’s security, such that the plaintiffs’ reliance 
on the market mechanism constituted indirect reliance. By requiring that plaintiffs 
provide legal proof that the defendant’s alleged misrepresentation actually caused 
the stock price to change, and by uniformly requiring plaintiffs to do so at class 
certification, courts can transform the fraud-on-the-market doctrine into a theory of 
indirect reliance that accords with Congress’s objectives in the PSLRA.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Although the Ninth Circuit’s decision in America West was 
undoubtedly influenced by the recent string of corporate fraud 
scandals, the court of appeals reached the correct legal result. That is, 
there should not be a bright-line rule that an omission or 
misrepresentation is immaterial as a matter of law in the absence of 
an immediate market reaction upon disclosure. As both the Supreme 
Court and the Ninth Circuit have indicated, materiality is a “mixed 
question of law and fact”141 that should best be left to a jury,142 not a 
court in the context of a motion to dismiss. Ultimately, the Third 
Circuit’s bright-line rule not only strips the jury of its role as fact 
finder but also insulates fraudulent corporate officials, accountants, 
and attorneys from liability.  
America West also reflects much more than the mere controversy 
surrounding the Third Circuit’s bright-line rule. The case exemplifies 
the confusion that the PSLRA has produced among federal judges 
and also demonstrates the Reform Act’s vulnerability to changes in 
the political and economic landscape. Much of the Ninth Circuit’s 
confusion in America West, as well as the uncertainty that 
practitioners face in applying the PSLRA, could be eliminated if 
Congress provided further guidance with respect to the materiality 
and reliance elements. Congress would do well to simply adopt a 
specific fraud-on-the-market theory or, in the alternative, simply 
renounce the fraud-on-the-market theory altogether and adopt an 
individualized loss-causation requirement.143 Without clarifying its 
position one way or the other, the intentions of Congress to reform 
securities fraud litigation will continue to succumb to the political 
and economic pressures that define the pre- and post-Enron eras.  
 
Patrick Hall 
 
 141. TCS Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976); see also supra notes 
25−28 and accompanying text.  
 142. Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1080−81 (9th Cir. 1995); see also supra notes 
25−28 and accompanying text. 
 143. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
